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A subject is a being who has a life to lead. In this pape1; I explore the array of 
resources that are available to us (i.e., Westemers at the tum of the millennium) to 
articulate and assess our lives. Specifically, I shall reflect 011 the impact that such 
matters may have on our naturalist conviction that the world ultimately consists of a 
causa/network where notions such as sense and value have no direct bearing. Some 
tend to assume that an implication of our naturalist world-view is that the notions of 
sense and value are inevz:tably relatz:ve to the subject's desires and inclinations. This 
is, howeve1; a line of reasoning that I would like to resist. For I am convinced that this 
approach unnecessarily restricts the number of resources to which we can legitimately 
appeal in order to lead our lives. This restriction will tum out to be quite serious 
because, as we shall see, it dramatically distorts our perception of the relevance that 
social ties may have in the life of a subject, as well as the conditions under which a 
human life may escape the absurd. 
A subject is a being who has a life to lead. It is an essential ingredient of this fact 
that there are several ways in which a subject may lead her life. Thus, a subject 
is forced to discern and articulate her existence through a range of chances and 
alternatives. It sounds reasonable then to explore and dete1mine the array of 
resources that are available to us (i.e., Westerners at the turn of the rnillenniurnf 
1 This paper draws materials from two recent papers of mine published in Spanish, 
namely: "Subjetividad y valor en un mundo natural", Teorema, 17 (1998), 25-44, and 
"Naturalismo y absurdo", XII Congres Valencid de Filosofia, Valencia, Societat de Filosofia 
del Pais Valencia, 1998, 49-62. I should also point out that part of the research for this paper 
has been financed by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Spanish Government 
via the Research Project "Realism, Deliberation and Truth" (BFF2000-1073-C04-03). 
2 To be more precise, I could say that, in this paper, the term "us" is meant to include 
those who share a naturalist outlook. However, the relevance of this definition is derived 
from the fact that it operates as the presumed outlook at the present stage of the Western 
tradition. This fact becomes apparent as one reflects on the nature of the explanations and 
predictions of phenomena that can be publicly offered without making qualifications about 
the peculiar convictions of the people who raise them. For instance, a religious explanation 
of an epidemic would require such previous qualifications, while they would surely be super-
fluous for an explanation in naturalist terms. If an aircraft crashes and most people survive, 
it comes as quite obvious that some religious thanksgiving ritual should take place. This is the 
default value. But, in that very ritual, one will surely ask for conscientious a research about 
the (natural)-causes of that crash in order to prevent further misfortunes. 
[87) 
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in order to cany out that constitutive quest. Such resources will comprise the 
fundamental elements to which a subject may appeal to orient and shape her life 
and, consequently, the terms in which she can assess the value and sense of 
any project or activity in which she may engage. The list of such resources, as 
well as their specific organization, will surely vmy from one culture to another, 
and for different periods within a single h·adition. We may say that each of those 
cultural variations represents a specific conception of the self, and that the task 
of this paper is to elucidate our conception of the self, that is, the array of 
resources on the basis ofwhich we may articulate and assess our lives. 
In particular, I would like to reflect on the impact that our naturalist convic-
tions have had on the kind of material that may play such a role in our lives. An 
element ofthis naturalist perspective is the belief that the world as it is in itself, 
independent of our wishes and inclinations, consists of a complex causal net-
work where the notions of value or sense have no room. It is true, however, that 
we experience our activities and engagements as valuable or empty, as making 
sense or being absurd; that certain activities are experienced by some as excit-
ing and plentiful, while others will view them as ridiculous and absurd. However, 
experiences like these cannot fonn a part of the natural fabric of the world. They 
must be secluded within the domain of our subjectivity, which have to do with 
the attitudes and inclinations of each one, so that the value of things and activi-
ties cannot be but a projection of the subject's attitudes and inclinations. This 
line of reasoning tends to assume that there is a domain of the subjective where 
the notions of sense and inh·insic value find their site, while the rest ofthe world 
(including the social world) appears as a mere insh·ument, or hurdle, for leading 
a valuable, meaningful life. 
This is, however, a line of argument that I would like to resist. For I am 
convinced that this approach unnecessarily reduces the number of resources to 
which we can appeal to lead our lives and, therefore, constitutes an inadequate 
elucidation of our conception of the self.3 Moreover, we will see, in due course, 
how dramatic this distortion may tum out to be, since it affects our perception of 
the relevance that social ties may have in the life of a subject, as well as the 
conditions under which a human life may escape the absurd. 
To carry out this challenge I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will outline the 
materials that the emergence of naturalism have rendered unavailable to us. 
Those materials will have to do with cettain transcendent legends which tend to 
indicate the means by which a subject may reach, typically in a subsequent life, 
a culminating stage where she will miss nothing and her highest demands will be 
accomplished. Yet, our naturalism prevents us from taking any such legend 
seriously and organizing our lives around it. At a second stage, I intend to put 
3 Our conception of the self is, in my view, ultimately constituted by our practices, by our 
actual responses to certain circumstances or scenarios. How much reflection is involved in 
these practices, and how the actual responses relate to the legitimate and the intelligible 
ones, are questions which I will not systematically address. I shall proceed, instead, by 
focusing on some rather elementary experiences and, only then, make some relatively 
general remarks and draw some conceptual distinctions, which may serve to improve our 
perspective on our conception of the self. 
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forward a certain picture of the maíÉêáalú=that may square with a naturalist stance. 
Within that picture, choice, desire-satisfaction, and pleasure will appear as ex-
clusive, or sometimes co-operative, candidates to define the basic elements in 
terms of which we may articulate and assess our lives. I will examine various 
versions of this picture, and then focus my challenge on the most promising 
ones. For, in my view, even the most attractive presentations of that picture are 
seriously distorted, since they leave out important resources which are associ-
ated with some of our most basic experiences. The paper will close with a posi-
tive outline of how our conception of the self is mticulated. 
1. Transcendent Legends and The Natural World 
"The fonnu la is hidden in the banjo. When the I OOOth string is broken, the box 
in the banjo will open, and the secret will come to light, and its magic will restore 
my sight." This is the legend, which inspired Chen Kaige's film Life on a string 
( 1993). These words are sung at the begi1ming of the film by a ten-year old child 
at his master's death. The child, like his master, is blind, and the legend describes 
the means by which he may recover his sight. The child, driven by that wish, 
wanders from village to village playing his banjo, thus earning his living as well 
as advancing toward the I OOOth string. As the child grows and ages, he gets 
closer and closer to his goal. By the age of sixty, he has only a few more strings 
to go, and is regarded by the people as a saint. He is now accompanied by a 
young man, named Sbidou, who is also blind and is nervously waiting for the 
moment when the Saint will break his last string. But Shidou is not totally under 
the spell of the legend; he wants it to be true, but needs to check whether the 
magic actually takes place before engaging in a life of banjo-playing. 
The Saint has also his doubts. As he goes for his last string, he becomes 
anxious and poignantly realizes that all his life depends on a fonnu la in his 
banjo, and wonders if this fonnula is really worth it. Two fears are expressed by 
this question: he is afraid that the secret may not work, but he is also apprehen-
sive that, if he recovers his sight, the world that he will be able to see might not 
coincide with the world that he has imagined. But, at this stage, there is no 
retum: he wants to see. 
The lOOOth string is broken, and now the Saint is entitled to bring the pre-
scription in his banjo to the pharmacist. The prescription is a blank piece of 
paper and the pharmacist laughs in the Saint's face. The Saint is appalled, his life 
rested on a single project, on a single string: the recovery of his sight by the 
magic of his banjo; and this has tumed out to be a delusion. The Saint has some 
outbursts of anger and realizes that he has been a fool. However, the fi lm ends 
with two scenes. In one, the Saint is singing among a crowd in his o ld style with 
, words of trust and confidence. The lyrics insist that we will see, and hear, but 
' now these words have a mere figurative sense. In the last scene, the Saint dies, 
and the villagers expect Shidou to follow his master's path. They hy to acclaim 
that Shidou is the new Saint, but the latter rejects this and walks away: thereby 
initiat ing a d ifferent route. 
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We are convinced that the development of natural sciences, together with 
other elements, places us in a situation similar to Shidou's. We somewhat envy 
the people who were allowed to believe in a legend that promised paradise, that 
is, a culminating stage where all our cravings will be satisfied, and our present 
pains and efforts rewarded. A legend that would appear as the most enticing 
project of one's life, given that it indicates the tools by which one may gain 
access to that paradise. The history of humanity is crowded with legends of this 
guise. The most robust ones tend to locate paradise beyond the boundaries of 
a subject's present life, and appeal to some divinity as the designer and guaran-
tor of the plan that will eventually lead to that promising land. For ages, people 
have had their lives shaped by one of these transcendent legends. To these 
people the question of whether one is faithful or not to the divine plan was 
central. Any other considerations such as pleasure or desire-satisfaction played 
a secondaty role, at least in this life. The different possibilities that life may bring 
to them were, therefore, ranked in accordance to that fundamental question. We 
may then say that this attitude expresses a transcendent conception of the self, 
that is, a conception where faithfulness to the transcendent plan defmes the 
fundamental dimension in terms ofwhich one must shape and assess her life.4 It 
is quite clear, however, that this conception of the self is at odds with essential 
features of our naturalist world-view. 
Physics represents the world as a sott of mechanism whose transformations 
are govemed by a system of strict physical laws5 and, relatedly, assumes the 
causal closure of its domain: every physical event e has a complete physical 
explanation or, more specitica1ly, there is a set of physical conditions which, in 
combination with a number of strict physical laws, necessitates the event e in 
question.6 Causal closure is a feature that only the properties stipulated by 
physics possess and, in this sense, they are ontologically more basic than any 
4 The Judaeo-Christian tradition has supplied the transcendent legend on the basis of 
which Western people have articulated their own lives for centuries. In fact, I am convinced 
that most religious experiences are inspired, in a more or less obscure way, in some transcen-
dent legend. I should emphasize, though, that this claim neither implies that the relevance 
that religious experiences may have for our lives is reduced to that of a transcendent legend; 
nor discards the possibility of religious experiences that seek to avert the consolations of a 
transcendent legend. The latter is the possibility that seems to animate Simone Weil as she 
uncovers certain self-deceptive ways of filling up the void: 
"We must have on one side the beliefs which fill up voids and sweeten what is bitter. The 
belief in immortality. The belief in the utility of sin: etiam peccata. The belief in the 
providential ordering of events-in short the consolations which are ordinarily sought 
in religion." (Weil (1987], 13) 
So, I just wish to oppose those (cf., for instance, Winch [l987c], 66-7 and Sanchez Dura 
(1993]) who seem to sustain that we necessarily misunderstand the nature of a religious 
experience if we interpret it as committed to a transcendent legend. 
s This claim is not undermined by the irreducible statistical laws of quantum mechanics. 
For a law can be both statistical and strict. 
6 Here, I rather confine myself to put forward a picture of the physical domain, even if 
1 do not subscribe to it myself. I would object, for instance, to the very notion of "a complete 
causal explanation", since 1 think it is inconsistent with some of our most fundamental 
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other set of properties that a theory might stipulate. The exact implications of 
this ontological primacy are, nevertheless, unclear. 
Some argue, for instance, that our metaphysical intuitions about the onto-
logical primacy of physics are consistent with the causal relevance (and, there-
fore, the existence) of properties posited by special sciences, like biology, chem-
istry or even psychology. So, we may not need to confme the properties of the 
world to the properties that a fully developed physics would posit. This ap-
proach surely gives rise to a multi-layered model of reality, wherein the physical 
structure of the world would lie at its bottom. With in this model, properties and 
entities at higher-levels, which sciences like chemis try and biology provide, will 
be recognized as metaphysically respectable, as patt of the furniture of the 
universe, insofar as they bear the appropriate connections with bottom-level 
(i.e., physical) properties and entities. 
Others doubt, however, that this multi-layer model will ultimately succeed, 
since important arguments have been put forward to the effect that this model 
cannot but lead to the causal inertness of higher-level properties. For it favors 
the understanding that the actual job, the real pushing and pulling is done by 
the physical properties and mechanisms which necessarily underlie any higher-
level process that one might individuate.7 Moreover, the problems increase as 
we focus on the kind of process that define the subject matter of psychology. 
For, as the cunent debate on mental causation and free will stresses, the natural-
ist stance may actuar'!y clash with the conviction that the content of our thoughts 
actually makes a difference in the world and, even more dramatically, with the 
fact that we have conscious experiences and that things matter to us. 8 
Be it as it may, all sides in this debate agree that physics singles out the basic 
causal network of the world, and grant that the fumiture of the universe is 
constituted by the properties and entities stipulated by physics, as well as all 
the properties and entities that bear the appropriate connection to those of 
physics. This, therefore, imposes a physicalist constraint on the kind of prop-
erty and entity that may be acknowledged to exist in the world, independently of 
our wishes and inclinations. 9 The exact strength of this constraint will depend 
on a proper elucidation of how the different levels of properties and entities úêÉ=
constituted, and what should count as "an appropriate connection" between 
them. This is where the different parties diverge. 
The transcendent conception presupposes that the universe is arranged in 
accordance with a cettain plan which, designed by a divinity, ensures a prom is-
intuit ions about causation (cf. Corbl and Prades [2000], eh. 5 and 6). Yet, the alternative 
characterization I would propose, although it is crucial to retain the causal relevance of 
mental contents, does not affect the role that transcendent legends may play in our lives. 
'Cf., for instance, Block [1990], Kim [1992], [1993]. 
8 Cf. Block [1980], Rosenthal [1991], Heil and Mele [1993], Block et al. (1996] for an 
overall review of this debate. 
• Cf. Nagel [1979a], [1986], Williams [1978], (198le], (1985] for the idea of an 
absolute conception of the world, independent of our wishes and inclinations; and Putnam 
11992] for a challenge to them. 
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ing outcome for those who keep faithful to it. The problem is that, no matter 
which interpretation of the naturalist constraint one prefers, there is no room in 
the world for such a plan. The world is a sequence of causal transitions which 
are subject to certain laws, but not the result of any plan or purpose because, 
among other things, godly designers are not listed in the inventmy of the world. 
Furthermore, the vety idea of a transcendent paradise, of a subject living a 
heavenly life is equally at odds with the naturalist perspective. If that life were 
supposed to be the life of an immaterial soul, then we would breach the physical-
ist constraint according to which, for any higher-level process, there must be 
some underlying physical mechanism. 10 If, on the contraty, one conceives the 
heavenly existence as an embodied, spatial one, then the idea of a region of the 
universe where all one's wishes and projects could be fully accomplished dur-
ing an infinite period oftime, seems to go beyond the boundaries of what should 
count as a living body and, therefore, a person. Hence, no matter how cherished 
the idea of a paradise may be to us, it seems clear, then, that the transcendent 
conception can no longer be adopted without paying the price of inconsistency 
or self-deception. 11 This is partly the sense in which we may claim that the 
transcendent conception is unavailable to us.12 
The multi-layer model of reality is inconsistent with the transcendent con-
ception of the self, but the impact of this model on our conception of the self 
may go far beyond that challenge. For, as we have seen, it is unclear whether 
that model is ultimately consistent with some general features of our subjectiv-
ity, like the existence of conscious experiences, or the causal relevance of the 
content of our thoughts. Nevet1heless, the pressure that this uncet1ainty exer-
cises on our conception of the self is less radical than one might expect. For it 
does not really seem to modifY the anay of resources that are available to us in 
the process of shaping our lives. 
The conflict between the naturalist constraint and the transcendent concep-
tion has led to discredit the latter as a guide for life that no one can rationally 
adopt. Yet, the tension between the naturalist constraint and the view of our-
selves as subjects who entertain thoughts, who perform actions anp for whom 
things matter, has not produced a similar upshot. We can detect the tension 
between both elements in our world-view, but are unable to dispense with any of 
them. Whatever conflict we may have with our naturalist convictions we catmot 
conceive ourselves as seriously considering that we do not have cet1ain experi-
ences or thoughts.13 ln other words, we have no idea ofhow one could articulate 
10 There are indeed powerful, standard arguments against the possibility of a person being 
an immaterial soul, which are independent of our physicalist convictions. They have to do 
with the impossibility of providing criteria of numerical identity for nonspatial entities. 
11 Consistency and lucidity with regard to the central aspects of our beliefs are hardly 
dispensable values for a subject, since a minimal degree of integration and lucidity appears to 
be a necessary condition for the very existence of a subject. However, it is just a minimal 
degree, and this leaves plenty of room for negotiation. 
12 Cf. James ( 1982) for the related notions of "living hypothesis" and "genuine option". 
13 Cf. Anscombe (1981), Winch (1987a], 89. 
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her life on the denial of such facts. Our conception of the self seems, then, to 
inevitably repose on the recognition or the above-mentioned features of our 
subjectivity: their denial is unavailable to us and cannot shape a subject's life. 14 
This line of reasoning is not meant to challenge the plausibility of an elimina-
tivist stance with regard to our mental contents and conscious states. For an 
eliminativist would typically reply that myths are incapable of apprehending 
how the world would look once one has got rid of a patticular myth. Therefore, 
our current incapacity to imagine an alternative in no way guarantees the meta-
physical plausibility of our present convictions. l may doubt the ultimate intel-
ligibility of this move, but my point at this stage is more modest: I am simply 
claiming that we do not know how a subject could seriously assume an elimina-
tivist view in the articulation of her life and, consequently, in the detennination 
of the resources that are available to her. This is why I do not think that the 
possibility of eliminativism affects our conception of the self. So, let us now go 
on and explore what that conception may turn out to be. 
2. The Composite Thesis and The Means-End Thesis 
The idea of a divine designer whose plan would take care of our deepest needs 
appears as so attractive and rewarding that a subject cannot but succumb to it, 
organizing and assessing her life in the light of her faithfulness to that plan. 
Such a possibility is now unavailable to us, but we still have a life to lead. 
Thereby the question as to how one should live poignantly arises. We cannot 
turn to the external world where no room for value exists; it is only within the 
domain of the subjective that values may emerge. Yet, the perception of this fact 
permeates our experience with a sense of arbih·ariness. It sounds as if it were up 
to each subject to embrace one or the other dimension as the pillar of her life. 
Fmther, as a result, any such commitment that a subject may adopt becomes in 
some impOitant sense tentative and, thereby, debilitated in its capacity to gener-
ate sense. In any case, our response to this seeming arbitrariness may go in 
several directions. Some may accept it as inescapable and insist on the concept 
of choice: leading a life is making choices, and the value and sense of one's life 
•• We are now in a position to state more precisely the sense in which the transcendent 
conception is unavailable to us. The root notion of availability may be stated like this: a 
resource R is available to a subject S ifT S can take R seriously, that is, can employ R in the 
shaping and assessment of her life. Then we may go on and specify some conditions under 
which R cannot be taken seriously by S and, therefore, R becomes unavailable to her: S 
cannot take R seriously if (a) S knows that R disagrees with some fundamental feature of her 
world-view, and (b) R is dispensable forS, that is, S knows how she could lead a life without 
relying on R. A consequence of this is that those who believe in the existence of the relevant 
conflict between R and their world-view, know how to dispense with R, and still stick to R, 
will rather be individuated as victims of self-deception. 
So, we may rehearse the discussion in the previous paragraphs by saying that transcen-
dent legends meet conditions (a) and (b) with regard to our naturalist outlook and are, 
therefore, unavailable to us. In contrast, the possible conflict between some general features 
of our subjectivity and our naturalism does not lead to the unavailability of the former 
because condition (b) remains unsatisfied. 
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is relative to her choices, since nothing has any value but insofar as it has been 
chosen. This is a mark of existentialism.15 However, some other people think that 
it is not so much up to us what may add value to our lives. To see their point we 
may consider the idea of a paradise, as a situation where all (or, at least, the most 
important of) our desires and needs are satisfied. What these people claim is 
that, even if there is no paradise, the fundamental dimension of a subject's life 
must be that of maximizing the satisfaction of her desires and needs. In other 
words, getting as close as possible to the paradise. This approach may sound 
attractive insofar as it exploits the sense in which the paradise may still be 
accessible to us, despite the naturalist disenchantment of the world. Yet, not all 
agree on this picture of paradise; 16 some do not envisage it as essentially asso-
ciated with the satisfaction of desires and needs, but with the idea of pleasure. 
Living in paradise is being in a continuous state of pleasure, irrespective ofhow 
this state is achieved. In a subject's life, the satisfaction of her desires or needs 
may be the most helpful means to promote her pleasure; but it is only the state 
itself of pleasure, not the means by which it is attained, that define the funda-
mental dimension in tenns of which the life of a subject must be appraised. 17 
Here we have three different pictures of the resources which a subject may 
count on to shape her life. In what follows, I will seek to elaborate and discuss a 
number of theses that such pictures suggest, but reserve my challenge to the 
most promising of them for the final sections of this paper. 
Consider the following case. John is a bright student and an excellent soccer 
player as well. He is quite seduced by the idea of becoming a good mathemati-
cian, but he has just been offered a very attractive contract from a big team, say 
Milan. The problem is that he is convinced that he cannot have it both ways. 
15 In this sense two quotes from Sartre [1957) may serve to illustrate this point: "Man is 
nothing else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism" (15) 
and " ... For it implies that they [all leaders) envisage a number of possibilities, and when they 
choose one, they realize that it has value because it is chosen" (21). Cf. Murdoch [1986] and 
Taylor [1982] for two attractive challenges to this viewpoint. 
16 An interesting advantage of the transcendent conception is that one need not to have 
a clear idea of what the paradise may consist of to engage in the exacting endeavour of 
pursuing it. It is the task of the divine architect to work out the details, while one can live 
with the reassuring conviction that the Almighty will do her task well. 
17 Thus, Bentham [1996) claims: ''Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside 
immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, 
the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning. This is true of every sort of 
pain, and of every sort of pleasi1re. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably, that 
there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one." (I 00). And, similarly, 
J. St. Mill (1931) asserts " ... that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things 
desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in 
any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the 
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." (6) The word "pleasure" may certainly 
be interpreted in various ways. Insofar as it designates a certain sensation, the claim that 
human beings aim at pleasure retains a precise content but becomes quite implausible. The 
problem is that if, on the contrary, one promotes a more sophisticated understanding of such 
a tenn, then it is no longer quite clear what the exact content of such a claim is or, in other 
words, how that claim relates to other claims about the goal of human life. 
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Playing for Milan will require full conc.entration and by the time he hangs his 
boots he will be too o ld to really have any chance of becoming a good, creative 
mathematician. He keeps weighing the pros and cons of each option, but he 
finds himself at an impasse: there is little reason to pick out one alternative 
instead of the other. John feels that any decision that he makes will therefore be 
arbitraty, so that the matter is just up to him. 
This is, indeed, the preferred scenario for those who insist on the notion of 
choice. 18 They would stress that Jolm is destined to shape his life by making his 
own choices and that, no matter what he decides, his life should be assessed in 
terms of the values that Jolm establishes as his own by choosing to act in some 
ways rather than others. Let us call this the Choice Thesis. 
There are, however, some experiences that this thesis may have trouble to 
accommodate. Suppose that Jolm fmally decides to join Milan, thereby renounc-
ing his possible life as a brilliant mathematician. According to the choice thesis, 
a life as a Milan player becomes, by the mere act of John's choice, more valuable 
to him than his possible career as a mathematician. By making thjs choice, John 
is sw·ely assuming some risks, since he may fail to achieve what he has chosen 
to pursue and, therefore, established as a valuable end for him. Many circum-
stances may prevent him from succeeding as a soccer player: an unfortunate 
injury, or the limitations ofhis own ski lls. Let us grant, however, that, despite the 
pressure and rivalry existing within the Milan team, John luckily becomes an 
indisputab le leader in this team, playing almost evety game and easily gaining 
the confidence of each new coach. Fmthennore, during the time he was there, 
Milan performs quite well, winning several Italian Leagues and European Cups. 
Thls being the case, it sounds as if John's life should be plentiful since he has 
achleved what he has chosen to and, therefore, what holds most value for him. 
This stmy may be incomplete, though. Suppose that John was very happy 
when he joined Milan, enjoying evety aspect of his activities with the team; but 
that, little by little, his enthusiasm begins to cool down and, after a few years, he 
fmds more and more of his activities as a professional player tedious, if not 
disgusting. Despite all his triumphs, John's life has become obscure and sad. At 
the time of his initial decision, he expected that a successful career as a soccer 
player would be accompanied by a more favorable mood, but it has not tumed 
out this way, and this seems to importantly diminish the value and sense of his 
life. The problem is, however, that this situation seems to contradict the picture 
that the choice thesis promotes: If Jolm has got all he has chosen, how could he 
miss anything at all? How could any other factor deteriorate the value of his life? 
Nonetheless, this is what actually happens, and I do not see how the choice 
thesis can really account for this fact. 19 
18 Strictly speaking, the kind of dilemmas that represent the preferred scenario involves 
a more explicit moral concern (cf. Sartre (1957]). 
19 One might try to accommodate this experience within the Choice Thesis by redefining 
the initial choice. One would then say that John's actual choice was not only to become a 
successful soccer player, but a successful and happy soccer player. lt is unclear, however, 
what choosing to be happy may mean other than choosing the activities that one thinks are 
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This kind of reflection may intimate two kinds of response. Some may sus-
pect that John's gloomy mood is due to some kind of frustration, to the fact that 
some of his deepest desires have not been satisfied. This line of reasoning rests 
on the plausible assumption that the frustration of a subject's desires and incli-
nations typically diminishes her qualitative well-being.20 It follows that a subject's 
deepest desires and inclinations impose some restrictions upon the choices that 
the subject may meaningfully make. A subject may surely choose to violate 
those restrictions, but not without a certain cost with respect to the meaning 
and value of her life. All this encourages a revision of the choice thesis that 
would incorporate further components of our subjectivity: not only choice, but 
the subject's desires and inclinations, as well as the nature of her qualitative 
states. Let us then speak of the Composite Thesis which could be characterized 
as follows: the resources on which a subject may base the orientation and 
assessment of her life, comprise not only her decisions, but her desires, inclina-
tions, and qualitative states as well.21 
Some may be reluctant to admit that the composite thesis is the right conclu-
sion that can be derived from John's case. For the idea of pleasure, of qualitative 
well-being,22 may play a more fundamental role than the composite thesis at-
tributes to it. ln fact, John's story seems to brings to light that it is only pleasure 
that matters. For John's initial choice and the achievement of the goals that he 
had chosen to pursue appear to come to nothing if they fail to engender happi-
ness within him. Moreover, if a subject has to carefully respect her deepest 
desires in her choices, it is just because her activities would be overcast with 
sadness and pain otherwise. All this encourages the thought that the ultimate 
value of a subject's life may be reduced to the attainment of pleasure; whHe 
desires and choices play a mere instrumental role: they are just some of the 
means according to which pleasure is obtained. We may speak of the Pleasure 
Thesis in this case, which we could state like this: pleasure is the fundamental 
dimension in terms of which a subject is bound to orient and assess her life. 
However, serious objections have been raised against this thesis. To begin, 
some may point to situations where a subject sacrifices her pleasure for the sake 
of satisfying a certain desire. A cyclist may prefer to spend several hours on her 
bike, riding in the sun, giving up the pleasure of refi·eshing shade, a cool beer, 
more likely to conduce one's happiness. So, attaining happiness ma)' have been one of the 
reasons behind John's choice, but may not form a part of the content of his choice. 
20 ln fact, the connection between the frustration of a subject's desires and her qualitative 
states is not merely causal. For the individuation of a subject's desires (and, specially, of her 
deepest desires) is not independent of the qualitative states that accompany the subject when 
they are satisfied. 
11 ln my view, Parfit [1984], 493-502 sustains a qualified version of the Composite 
Thesis. 
22 For the sake of simplicity, I will tend to use "pleasure" to designate those qualitative 
states whose possession is acknowledged as valuable. A more sophisticated understanding of 
the word "pleasure" would surely render the Pleasure Thesis more plausible but quite indistin-
guishable from the Composite one. 
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and an appealing swimming pool. qháú=may not sound, though, like a very 
pressing consideration. For one could always reply in defense of the pleasure 
thesis that either there is some sense of pleasure in cycling, such that the cyclist 
is experiencing more pleasme riding than she would have swimming and sitting 
in the shade. Alternatively, that the present effort is being made in the hope of a 
later compensation. lt is unclear to me how that "sense of pleasure" could be 
individuated so that the pleasure thesis could both retain some content and be 
h·ue. There is, however, a more forceful and simple objection, which goes like 
this: the pleasme that a subject derives fi·om the satisfaction of a desire D 
presupposes that its satisfaction matters to her intrinsically, that is, irrespective 
of its capacity to bring about some pleasure.23 To follow up the previous ex-
ample, we can say that if the cyclist is able to derive some pleasure fi·om her 
exhausting activity, it is because cycling matters to her; if pleasure were all that 
mattered to her, she would have found her exhausting cycling almost unbear-
able and, therefore, would have derived no pleasure from it. This situation seems 
to represent a more serious challenge to the Pleasure Thesis. For, even in those 
scenarios that supposedly favor this thesis, some systematic elements may be 
detected that manifestly conflict with the claim that pleasure is all that ultimately 
matters to the subject. This upshot will be reinforced in the two next sections by 
the introduction of notions such as attaclunent and significance. But let us now 
go back to the Composite Thesis which is, so far, the only survivor. 
The Composite Thesis is supposed to set out the criteria that dete1mine the 
value which a given activity or goal may have for a certain subject. Some people 
may, therefore, construe the composite thesis as supplying a principled way to 
distinguish those activities or situations that have an intrinsic value, that are 
ends in themselves, from those whose value is merely extrinsic, that is, whose 
value is derived from its capacity to serve as means or as instruments to achieve 
what is intrinsically valuable. Thus, they say that those situations which fulfil 
the adequate blend of choice, desire-satisfaction, and pleasure have intrinsic 
value, while the rest of the circumstances and endeavours appear as mere means 
or hurdles for the flourishing of those intrinsically valuable situations. Dusting 
the furniture in my room may lack any intrinsic value to me, but it is still an 
efficient means of preventing my autumn asthmatic reactions and, therefore, it 
has an exh·insic, instrumental value for me, which is indeed relative to my wish to 
avert astlunatic attacks. 
u Cf. Feinberg [ 1978), 464 and Wiggins [1987], I 04-5. This retort holds except, of 
course, for the limited range of cases where the object of the desire is just to bring about 
pleasure, like when one lies on a sandy beach and feels the tender rays of the god Sun on her 
skin. 
One may attempt to preserve some aspects of the Pleasure Thesis by claiming that, 
even if pleasure is not all that mat1ers, the pursuit of pleasure is the ultimate motivation 
behind the acquisition and preservation of all our dispositions. Apart from the risk of 
emptiness that this manoeuvre obviously involves, it seems to me that the line of reasoning 
that was proposed for particular actions, holds for dispositions too. Part of the pleasure that 
we derive from some of our attitudes and dispositions requires that the pursuit of such 
pleasure is not the unique ultimate motivation for their acquisition and preservation. This 
point may become clearer in the next section when I introduce the notion of attachment. 
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In light of this, some may assume that there are only two senses in which an 
activity may be valuable: either inh·insically or extrinsically.24 Correspondingly, 
some claim that leading a life consists of developing a number of activities that 
serve as mere means to the attainment of certain goals or situations that, accord-
ing to the Composite Thesis, are of intrinsic value to the subject in question. Ler 
us refer to this claim as the Means-End Thesis. 
Some may see this thesis as a mere corollaty ofthe Composite Thesis, failing 
to understand how one could endorse the latter without accepting the former. 
Yet, the transition from the Composite Thesis to the Means-End Thesis requires 
an additional assumption that I mentioned above. Namely, the value of an activ-
ity or situation must be either intrinsic or instrumental. However, before discuss-
ing this assumption, let us explore how the adoption of the Means-End Thesis 
may affect some crucial aspects of our lives, that is, the value of social and 
personal ties, as well as the ultimate absurdity of human life. 
We are social anjmals. We bear personal links with other members of our 
species. We also belong to a family, and form a pat1 of different sot1s of social 
settings, such as cities, h·ibes, nations, institutions, and so forth. The life of 
each individual includes a web of such connections. But what is the relevance 
of such ties in a subject's life? More specifically, what is, according to the 
Means-End Thesis, the value that all these bonds may have in the life of a 
subject? Are they intrinsically or insh·umentally valuable? It has been argued 
that, according to the Means-End Thesis,25 those social and personal bonds are 
only valuable insofar as they serve to fulfil the subject's purposes and inclina-
tions. Therefore, their value cannot but be merely extrinsic or instrumental. The 
social world appears then as "nothing more than an arena in which individuals 
seek to secure what is useful or agreeable to them".26 This claim about the nature 
of the social world thus emerges as an upshot which ultimately derives (via the 
Composite Thesis and a seemingly trivial assumption) from the disenchantment 
of the universe that our naturalist convictions impose. So, it sounds as if we are 
bound to consider our social life from this perspective, which is, in fact, the 
dominant approach in the teclmological developed societies of our planet. Nev-
et1heless, this perspective may be excluding, as I shall h')' to argue, an important 
range of social possibilities that are actually open to us. In that case, one should 
ask why those possibilities tend to be concealed, as well as denounce those 
24 This assumption seems to inspire the Saint's story, and certainly permeates most 
transcendent legends, so that keeping faithful to the divine plan has a mere instrumental 
value, since only life in the paradise would actually be of intrinsic value. 
2s Maclntyre [ 1981] is mainly concerned with emotivism (i .e., "Ernotivism is the 
doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral judgements are 
nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are 
moral or evaluative in character" (11 -2)), which ultimately is the linguistic version of the 
Composite Thesis. He insists that emotivism is bound to envisage all social relations as 
manipulative, that is, as relations where "each person treats the other primarily as a means 
to his or her ends." (23). 
26 Maclntyre [ 1981 ), 236. 
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social practices and policies that rely on. that limited understanding of our social 
life for their legitimization. 
In fact, I will tty to show the restrictions that a instrumental treatment of the 
social world imposes cannot be based on our naturalist stance. To this purpose, 
1 will, firstly, argue that this instmmental treatment does not even follow from the 
Means-End Thesis and, secondly, propose some examples that may be used to 
call into question the Means-End Thesis itself and, relatedly, enlarge the space 
of our social experience. Thus, the dominant perception of the role that social 
activities and engagements may have in a subject's life will appear as inad-
equate, that is, as neglecting some of our most meaningful options. 
Let us now shift to the second sequel of the means-end that I wished to 
present. Our naturalist convictions, together with the intrinsic vs. extrinsic ap-
proach to value, seem to entail the ultimate absurdity of our lives. As Nagel puts 
it/7 the experience of the absurd arises from the conflict between two perspec-
tives, which are available to us. We may adopt, on the one hand, an internal 
perspective and apprehend the value of our activities and engagements in the 
light of our choices, desires and moods. From this perspective, the value of our 
Jives would vaty in accordance with our capacity to fit our psychological de-
mands, but there is no sense in which human life is necessarily absurd. There is, 
however, an external perspective, which consists in the perception of the idea of 
nature as a purposeless sequence of events, and with regard to which our ends 
and purposes are dispossessed of any intrinsic value. This encourages the 
thought that ail our concerns are ultimately futile. For it would not even help, in 
this respect, to inscribe one's life in the context of a much larger plan, either 
social or divine, since, from this external perspective, evety plan is inevitably 
empty and pointless. 
The availability of this external perspective is constitutive of a naturalist 
outlook. We therefore seem to be inescapably trapped between two conflicting 
perspectives. On the one hand, we cannot but take seriously our own desires 
and interests, and pursue them intensely, and, on the other, all these concerns 
appear as vain to us: "These two inescapable viewpoints collide in us, and that 
is what makes life absurd". 28 But this sounds like a rather radical implication of 
naturalism for our conception of the self. For, instead of suggesting an alterna-
tive dimension in terms of which we can atticulate and assess our lives, it invites 
us to conceive our lives as ultimately valueless and absurd. 
However, how do I want to react to all this? What is my position with regard 
to the theses and implications that have survived through this section? To 
begin, I think that the Composite Thesis is severely incomplete, since it leaves 
"Nagel's [l979b] line of reasoning is apparently more general than the one I intend to 
display here, since it sometimes sounds as if he were not committed to the intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic approach to value. Yet, I prefer to assume that approach in the exposition of the 
argument to make it more compelling. For, as we shall see by the end of the paper, once the 
intrinsic vs. extrinsic approach is dropped, some possibilities are opened that cast doubt on 
the argument in question. 
10 Nagel [ l979b ), \53. 
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some substantial elements which are actually available to us as resources that 
can be used to shape and assess our lives out of the picture. To bring these 
important elements to light, I shall discuss the Means-End Thesis, which some 
may mistakenly view as a mere corollary of the Composite one. My discussion 
of the Means-End Thesis will follow a rather crooked path which, I hope, will 
fma lly shed some light on the main purpose of this paper: to emphasize the 
narrowness of certain elucidations of our conception of the self. 
The path will proceed like this. Firstly, I will cast doubt on the instrumental 
treatment of the social world which, according to some, follows from the Means-
End Thesis. This will permit me to introduce the notion of integrity as one of the 
components of our conception of the self. Secondly, I intend to revise the inn·in-
sic vs. extrinsic approach to value, and this process will lead me to the notion of 
significance, which will emerge as an additional element in terms of which we 
may shape or assess our lives. The notion of significance will fmally serve to 
challenge the argument for the absurd. In the last section, I will assemble all 
these materials to introduce some general remarks about our conception of the 
self. 
3. Attachments 
The social world is, according to some, an arena where subjects strive to fmd 
means that serve to accomplish their respective desires, purposes, and inclina-
tions. This is the perception of the social domain that seems to be derived from 
the Means-End Thesis. I suspect, however, that this perception falsities the role 
that social activities and conunitments may play in the life of a subject. To 
motivate this suspicion, I will, firstly, argue that, contraty to what some claim, 
the Means-End Thesis does not entail an insn·umental treahnent of the social 
domain; and, secondly, I will explore the two different senses in which the value 
of a social tie may not be merely instrwnental. One of these senses will represent 
a challenge for the Composite Thesis and, therefore, for the Means-End Thesis 
as well. 
Those who claim that the Means-End Thesis entails an instrumental treat-
ment of the social world disregard the fact that cultivation of some social or 
personal ties may constitute the object of a ·subject's desires. In John's case, for 
instance, we find that he has desires and the objects of these desires were 
clearly social: he wanted to join Milan, he wanted to be respected by his team-
mates and the coach, he wanted to play every important game, and so forth. So, 
we could say that, according to the Means-End Thesis, some portions of Jolm's 
social activity may not have had a mere insnumental value to him, but an inn·in-
sic one.29 It follows that the Means-End Thesis need not reduce a subject's 
Oú=Strictly speaking, the satisfaction of desire does not have intrinsic value according to 
the Means-End Thesis unless it were appropriately accompanied by other psychological 
factors, such as pleasure and choice. These additional factors are not given in John 's story, 
but another story, which l have skipped for the sake of simplicity, could be told where they 
were accomplished. 
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social links to mere means, since those ,links may be intrinsically valuable to a 
subject insofar as they are the object of her desires. It is surely true that, accord-
ing to the Means-End Thesis, the value of a social tic is relative to the subject's 
.desires and purposes. Moreover, this relativization is fully compatible with the 
fact that a social tie should be the object of a desire and, therefore, that the value 
of that social tie should be intrinsic and not instrumental for the subject in 
question.30 
This defines a first sense in which a social link may not be reduced to a mere 
instrumental value, namely, by becoming the object of a subject's desire. There 
is, however, a second sense which has to do with the notion of integrity and I 
intend to explore in the coming paragraphs. This second sense, as opposed to 
the fu·st, will bring out the inadequacy of the Composite Thesis (and, therefore, 
of the Means-End Thesis). In patticular, we shall see in what sense the Means-
End Thesis does ultimately entail an instnnnental treatment of the social world. 
Charles, a truck driver, runs over a chiJcl.ll The driver is so shocked that he 
faints. When he gains consciousness at the hospital, he asks: "How is the 
child? Did 1 kill her? Is she badly hutt?" Suppose the doctor's answer is: "No, 
she is at home and well, just a few scratches". The driver feels, at ftrst, relieved, 
but then he begins to worry. He thinks he perceived something weird in the 
doctor's words, maybe in his voice, maybe in his gestures: it sounds as if he had 
not been as reassuring as he should have been. The driver suspects that he is 
being deceived; that they want to keep the real facts from him to facilitate his 
recovety, since, after all, he is not to blame. The child just ran in 6·ont h is h·uck. 
The next day he raises the same question again to the doctors and inquires 
among the nurses and his fami ly. He always gets the same answer, but their 
replies are still peculiar. He asks to see the child, but they comment that this is 
not advisable, that it would be bad for the child to revive the situation and that 
her parents for this reason want to keep her away from him. After a few days, 
Charles stops asking questions and, fmally, accepts that the child is all right. 
Unfortunately, Charles has been deluded, the child was crippled as a result of 
the accident and has to sit in a wheelchair for the rest of her life. 
It is true that Charles's intensive questioning expresses a concern for the 
child's well-being, but what kind of concern is tills? It could be that Charles's 
interest was almost entirely instrumental: he might just have been worried about 
the economic and juridical implications of the accident. After all, if something 
10 On some occasions, a social situation may be of intrinsic value to a subject because, to 
use Williams's (1973b], 260-5 terms, such a situation is the oúàÉcí=of a non-1 desire, that is, 
a desire whose propositional content does not require the introduction of "I" or any related 
expression ("my", "me"). This is so, for instance, as John desires Mary's welfare, even when 
he can neither contribute to nor know about it. Furthem1ore, it seems that human beings are 
constituted in such a .way that they cannot but have 1-desires whose content is essentially 
social. Consider our need for social recognition, which gives rise to desires in whose propo-
sitional content !-related expressions must figure, but a social relation too. What the subject 
desires in such cases is that the other bears a certain relation to ber (cf. Todorov [1995]). 
11 This case represents a rather free adaptation of a well-known example proposed by 
Williams ( 1981 b), 28-29, although for fairly different purposes. 
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wrong had actually happened to the child, the family might sue him, and they 
might convince the judge that it was somewhat his fault, and this would bring 
him some trouble. So, some may c laim that his insistent questioning in the 
hospital should be construed as merely serving this instrwnental preoccupa-
tion. Nevertheless, we may find ourselves reluctant to accept this claim, to 
acknowledge that Charles's interest in the child's condition was entirely instru-
mental. Consider, for instance, that Charles was offered two equally satisfactory 
solutions to his economic and juridical won·ies, one implying the recovery of the 
chi Id and the other her continued crippled existence, and that he was indifferent 
to either solution. This would appear as distressingly odd to us, since we may 
feel that a systematic indifference in this and related scenarios brings us to the 
verge of insanity.32 Nobody doubts that Charles's interest in the child's condi-
tion might be predominantly instrumental and, still, the problem is that we expe-
rience some trouble in understanding how it could be exclusively instrumental. 
We would need to search for a specific explanation whenever that exclusivity 
may appear to show up. Thereby we are assuming that a condition for the 
intelligibility of the situation, as it is described prior to the explanation, is that at 
least a minimal noninstrumenlal aspect should be present in Charles's concern. 
The weight of this non instrumental aspect in a subject's concern will be 
determined by the way she actually responds to the situation at stake. Thus, 
Charles's activities and comments about the child's state may express that the 
nature of his interest in her well-being was predominantly instrumental and, 
thus, reducing the noninstrumental aspect to a minimum. But Charles could 
have responded differently. Suppose, for instance, that he had been rather ac-
tive in preserving his economic and juridical interests. However, once they were 
ensnred, he undertook the necessary actions to guarantee that the crippled 
child was duly attended and that she would get some sort of compensation. We 
would surely interpret this response as expressing a concern where the non-
instrumental aspects bear a more important role than in the first version of 
Charles's case. 
But what is the natw·c of this noninstrumental aspect of Charles's concern? 
Doesn't it reduce to the fact that the child's well-being is the object of one of 
Charles's desires? To ground a negative answer to the latter question, let us 
step back from the obvious and ask: why is it that Charles has become interested 
in this patticular child? What is special about her? It seems clear that Charles 
need not have found anything exh·aordinary about this child to be specially 
interested in her: the intrinsic features ofthe chi ld in question may have been 
much less remarkable fi·om Charles's viewpoint than those of other children in 
his own city or countty. So, the child's intrinsic features can hardly explain 
Charles's special preoccupation with her. Where can we then look for an an-
swer? The existent relation between Charles and the child sounds like an obvi-
ous candidate; in fact, Charles is connected to the child in a rather special way: 
H A preference for the child to be crippled would appear as a kind of perversion which, 
unless some specific motivation would mediate, may represent another form of madness. 
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Charles may have caused her ineparabl.e damage. Moreover, it is this relation 
that prompts a cettain response on Charles's part: a response that involves the 
emergence of a concern. 
There is an important sense in which Charles's response is not the result of 
a choice or decision, but rather has been imposed upon him by his location in 
that particular scenario. The fact that it is imposed does not imply that Charles 
could not have eventually chosen to withdraw from it. In this case, the idea of 
imposition is meant to convey that Charles could only have avoided that re-
sponse by assuming a cettain kind of cost. The experience of this cost is inter-
nally coru1ected with the notion of integrity. In fact, we may explain that kind of 
cost by appealing to Charles's integrity. We could, thus, point out that Charles's 
failure to give an appropriate response would have damaged his self-image, 
since he would appear to himself as a subject who is incapable of living up to 
what he most values, and that this is the kind of cost that he would have to pay. 
But, on the other hand, any attempt to smt out the notion of integrity, of what 
should count as a subject's highest values, will take us back to the experience of 
a certain kind of cost. Thus, the identification of a subject's highest values will 
go hand in hand with the identification of situations in which the subject will 
discover herself as fa ll ing short. However, what is this experie.nce of falling 
sh01t? Falling short has to do with what a subject most values, which differs 
from what she most desires. The inability to fulfil one's strongest desires may 
lead to fhtstration, while falling short ofliving in accordance with one's highest 
values is accompanied by a sense of degradation. Degradation is just another 
name for the cost that Charles would experience if he dropped the demands that 
he recognizes as imposed upon him by the fact that he has run over child. So, the 
notions of integrity, highest values, and degradation fonn a circle of notions 
that point to a single experience, namely: the experience that cases like Charles's, 
and especially moral dilemmas, bring to ligbt.33 
At this stage, it may be relevant to indicate that the force of the preceding 
line of reasoning does not depend on the fact that truck drivers are actually 
attached to the persons over whom they may run over. Needless to say, this was 
proposed just as an example. The only point I need to rely upon is that, for any 
given subject, there will be some scenarios that she will recognize as imposing 
cettain kinds of demands upon her. The particular characteristics of these sce-
narios and the specific demands that they may impose may be quite variable 
33 The experience of degradation is not necessarily confined to cases where other people 
are involved. The incapacity to live up to the standards imposed by those projects in which 
one engages, and are viewed as central to one's life, is certainly another source of degrada-
tion. Relatedly, that experience may also arise as a result of failing to engage in certain 
projects that are perceived as important. In general, the experience of degradation has to do 
with the perception of the inadequacy of our response to what one sees as the demands that 
one's life makes on oneself, even when nobody else is directly involved. For a further 
exploration of the kind of cost I am referring to, cf. Tayior (1982), [1989], eh. I, (1995], 
Macintyre [ I981], eh. 15, '.¥illiams [I973a), [198Ia), [198lc), (1981d], (1985) , eh. 10, 
[1995), Weil (1987], Winch ( 1987d). 
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across individuals and culturcs.14 The issue is that it should form a part of our 
concept of sanity; that a human being should recognize some of those sce-
narios, and their corresponding demands. This is all that is required to introduce 
the notion of integrity and the related experience of degradation. 
On this basis, we can now see the important sense in which the link between 
Charles and the child is not merely instrumental. From the perspective of the 
Means-End Thesis, the only way in which a link may not be merely instrumental 
is by being intrinsic. Intrinsic in this context simply means that this link is the 
object of a desire. The previous remarks, though, convey a different, deeper 
sense in which a social link may not be merely instrumental, namely: a social link 
whose adequate attendance affects the subject's integrity.15 I propose to re-
serve the word "attachment' to designate that kind of social or personal tie.36 
However, some may be unwill ing to grant that attachments do really possess 
a noninstrumental value. For, they would argue, the appropriate cultivation of 
our attachments is just a means to preserve our integrity, which is what in those 
scenarios ultimately matters to us. Yet, like in the c.ase of the relation between 
. desire and pleasure, we could reply that it is only because the child's condition 
matters to Charles that neglecting her would have a cost for him. The idea of 
caring only for one's integrity, like the idea that pleasure is all that matters, is 
ultimately inconsistent. Indeed, this is not to deny that one may be more self-
indulgent and caring, on certain occasions, about retaining one's sense of in-
tegrity than about the interests of the people to whom one is attached. The 
úY= It forms a part of Charles's experience that the demand that the child is making upon 
him has to do with the way we are (though not specifically with the way he is) and, therefore, 
that it would have been imposed upon anyone else placed in a relevantly similar situation. 
And yet Charles could unproblematically grant that some other people would not perceive 
that demand and, more interestingly, that in some communities that demand would not have 
arisen. The latter possibility affects the domain of "we" and "anyone" in complex ways, 
since Charles is not simply assuming that the existence of the demand is a convention of the 
community which he recognizes as belonging to. For, among other things, he takes it that, 
despite some variations in the particular scenarios, all human communities must have a place 
for that kind of demand. 
Js In Charles's case, we sense that his integrity would be resented if he failed to appropri-
ately contribute to the child's well-being. However, there arc also sit11ations in which the 
subject's integrity would suffer because of his failure in destroying or causing hann to some-
one else. Such is the nature of vendettas, where one cannot rest until the murdered relative 
is avenged. In such cases, causing harm is seen as the only way to repair some previous harm 
and re-establish the broken order. A similar notion of order is present in Charles's case, 
although in this case, harm is balanced with attention. The survival value of the vendetta is 
indeed unquestionable, but, if my considerations in this section are correct, the value of 
restoring the order is not merely instrumental, since the failure to recover is experienced as 
a degradation of that order. 
Jo We could also use the term "attachment" in a more general sense, which would not 
only be concerned with social links, but with all aspects of a subject's life whose adequate 
attendance affect her sense of integrity or degradation. Thus, we could reasonably say, under 
certain conditions, that a given artist is attached to her work, or a craftswomen to the quality 
of her production. In this paper, though, I usually employ "attachment" in the restricted 
sense, leaving the possibility of drawing more general connections to the reader. 
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problem is that self-indulgence, like the pursuit of pleasure, is parasitic upon 
other responses, which do not deserve that description. 
We may then conclude that the object of a subject's attachment is not of a 
mere instrumental value to her. But what is the notion of instrumentality in-
volved here? We have seen that attachments have to do with the preservation 
of the subject's integrity, and not with the mere satisfaction of her desires. Let 
us, then, fmther explore the nature of this contraposition to elaborate the two 
different senses in which social relations may not have a merely instrumental 
value. 
We may statt off with an experience that fits nicely with the Means-End 
Thesis. Suppose that Peter actually desires Maty's welfare, but let us assume 
that, given the circumstances (Maty is seriously ill, for instance), the satisfac-
tion of this desire is beginning to conflict with several other desires of his. We 
may then ask what kind of element could figure in a process of deliberation with 
regard to whether he should preserve this desire or rather seek to extinguish it. 
Peter will surely have to think about the relative strength of his desires, the 
energy required to satisfy them as well as how they are intercoxmected, the 
reliability of the means available to him to satisfy those desires, his capacity to 
extinguish a cettain desire, and so forth. However, would Peter be allowed, 
according to the Means-End Thesis, to include in that deliberation the fact that 
Mary would lead an extremely miserable life if he extinguished his desire and, 
therefore, stopped looking after her? The cmcial question in Peter's deliberation 
should be whether a situation where his desire for Mary's welfare is over would 
be more or less rewarding than the present one. In other words, if Peter rightly 
concludes that he must engage in the process of extinguishing his desire for 
Maty's welfare because, under the circumstances, it is scarcely rewarding com-
pared to other desires that Peter might alternatively cultivate, there is no reason 
within the Means-End Thesis not to do so. Nevertheless, we would surely 
understand that, if Peter chooses to abolish the desire at stake, Maty may come 
to see herself as a mere instrument in Peter's life, as a tool that is abandoned as 
soon as it cannot do its job. 
This notion of instrumentality (and, therefore, ofnoninstrumentality) seems 
to go beyond the confines of the Means-End Thesis and is closely connected to 
the experience of attachment. Thus, one could say that Mary's sickness has led 
her to discover that Peter was not really attached to her, that he did not really 
care about her, that she has just been useful to him for a while and is dropped as 
circumstances tum her into a hurdle. Yet, why should we say that the experience 
of attachment apprehends the notion of instrumentality that Maty is employ-
ing? 
A subject is attached to another subject X when she recognizes that X 
makes a demand or claim on her. A criterion of this recognition is that the subject 
would have to pay a certain kind of cost if she fails to honor it. This is so even 
when serving the attachment to X inevitably conflicts with other attachments. 
The subject may cextainly tly to get rid of the perception of that cost and, 
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therefore, of that attachment. The subject may seek to do so to avoid both the 
cff01t ofhonoring it and the cost that for her integrity would have to disregard 
that demand. Seeking to eliminate that perception is, in that case, a peculiar way 
of not respecting the demand. For engaging in such abolishing procedure is an 
illegitimate move from the viewpoint ofthe demand in question: the perception 
of the demand involves the perception of the illegitimacy of that move. This 
does not amount to saying that all revisions in one's attachments are illegitimate 
from the perspective of such attachments. Rather, my point is that attachments 
impose certain consh·aints on the conditions under which that revision could be 
legitimately carried out, while such a notion of legitimacy is absent insofar as 
only desires are concerned. More specifically, I am claiming that Mary's actual 
fate would fonn a patt of any deliberation that would legitimize the extinction of 
Peter's attachment. The circumstances in which we should see Peter's abolish-
ing move as legitimate (even if inevitably accompanied with a sense of loss) 
would coincide with those in which we would perceive Mary's reproach of 
being neglected as unwarranted.37 
In light ofthis, we may read two kinds of reproach on Maty's lips. Firstly, she 
may feel instrumentalized by Peter insofar as the latter was not attached to her 
and his promotion ofMaty's welfare was relative to his desires. This accusation 
of instrumentality only makes sense in contraposition with some other kind of 
relation which is viewed as noninstrumental like, for instance, an attachment. 
Let us then speak of detached instrumentality to express the nature of this first 
reproach.38 Secondly, we may suppose that Peter was really attached to Mary. 
The criterion ofhis attachment, and not merely linked to her by his desire, would 
surely be that he would experience a cettain kind of cost if he neglected the claim 
that Mary is making on him. Suppose that, under the circumstances, Peter actu-
ally fails to honor his attachment; in that case, Mary might legitimately feel 
disregarded, and might retrospectively revise the sh·ength of Peter's attachment 
or her image of him, but would not be entitled to sec herself as having been a 
mere instrument in Peter's life. 
The experience of attachment comes, then, to reinforce our case against the 
instrumental treahnent of the social world, which appears, by now, as too narrow 
an approach, incapable of taking stock of the various ways in which social life 
may affect the value of a subject's life. However, this experience also brings to 
light the inadequacy of the Composite Thesis (and, therefore, of the Means-End 
, There is indeed room for a gap between Mary's perception and a proper perception of 
the situation. This normative element is also present in Charles's experience as he assumes 
that his perception of the demand is anyone's perception. The links between an individual's 
perception, our perception and the correct perception surely constitute an important por-
tion of the fabric of any normative notion and, in the end, of the very idea of rationality. 
However, this is indeed a fundamental issue upon which I cannot dwell here. 
" I hope it is clear by now why a benevolent disposition, insofar as it is construed as a 
mere desire to contribute to other people's welfare, sti ll envisages the other instrumentally 
and does not apprehend the very nature of attachments. I suspect, however, that the 
ordinary notion of benevolence could hardly be interpreted in terms of mere desire. 
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Thesis), since the latter has made no room for the notions of integrity and 
degradation and, relatedly, cannot grasp the normative sense of instrumentality. 
In the next section, I shall complete my challenge to these theses by discussing 
the argument for the absurd. 
4. Significance and the Argument for the Absurd 
The absurd was singled out in section 3 as an inescapable consequence of the 
Means-End Thesis, according to the assumption of naturalism. Those ends 
that, from an inner perspective, may appear as intrinsically valuable or impor-
tant, are from a naturalist stance inevitably h·ivial and itTelevant, since there is no 
room within this external perspective for the notion of impmiance or value. 
However, 1 am reluctant to accept that this form of the absurd is an unavoidable 
implication of our naturalist outlook. To support my opposition, I will take a 
number of steps. Firstly, I will present an example which will allow me to intro-
duce the notion of "constitutive link", which is meant to apprehend a kind of 
connection between activities, which is not merely instrumental. This notion 
will be used, at a second stage, to revise the conditions under which a human life 
may make sense and, as a result, the argument for the absurd will be challenged. 
There is some distance between the nearest news-stand and Cannen's flat 
so she has to walk for ten minutes to get her paper. This is the experience I want 
to focus upon: Cannen's walk to buy a newspaper. This experience takes place 
almost evety day: sometimes it is nice and sunny, but often the weather is a bit 
harsh because of the rain, the wind or the heat; still, Carmen likes her almost 
daily stroll to the news-stand. In fact, she prefers walking rather than getting her 
newspaper delivered at her door, since tllis would deprive her of the motivation 
to get out every morning and breathe the fresh air of a new day. 
Carmen's story refers to an end (buying a newspaper) and some means 
(walking to the closest news-stand) to accomplish that end. We could then say 
that the walk is instrumentally related to obtaining the paper, and this much 
would be true, but we may be underdescribing the experience. For this charac-
terization is unable to differentiate Cannen's case from that of Michael who, 
despite his hatred of walking, walks for ten minutes every day to pick up his 
paper. This is the case of a person who prefers to have his paper delivered at his 
door but, for some reason, cannot get it. It seems, then, that some additional 
specifications are required to distinguish the peculiarity ofCannen's case. Thus, 
one could say that the real divergence between Carmen and Michaellies in the 
goals that they pursue; Michael's objective is just getting the paper, while 
Cannen's goal is slightly more complex, namely: walking to get the paper. This is 
surely a way of expressing the disparity between them, but it hides the nature of 
their respective experiences of walking to buy the paper, which is the object of 
our concem. ln a sense, we can agree that Carmen and Michael have distinct 
interests precisely because we detect important differences in their respective 
walking experiences. It is the structure of these differences that I wish to dis-
cern. For starters, we could say that Michael's relation to the walk is merely 
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instrumental, but Carmen's is not.39 Much of the disparity between Michael and 
Cannen rests on the adverb "merely" since the latter's waLk has an instrumental 
value too, but not a merely instrumental one. 
What do we mean, then, when we say that Michael 's walk is just instrumen-
tal? Well, we are saying that his walk to the news-stand plays no role in his li fe 
apart from allowing him to get the newspaper. The walk is a waste of time for him 
and possibly a painful moment which is compensated only by the pleasure of 
reading the paper. Merely instrumental activities seek a compensation, which 
one expects to obtain from the goal to which they serve. In other words, a merely 
instrumental activity only makes sense if it is ultimately compensated. Needless 
to say, merely instrumental activities are quite fragile from the viewpoint of 
sense, since they decisively depend on success which, in turn, depends on 
factors quite separate from the subject's control. Furthermore, success can also 
be instrumentalized: Michael gets the paper and reads it not because he enjoys 
doing so, but because he thinks he needs it to keep updated; to be able to talk 
and make witty comments at patties. But, of course, he does not really enjoy 
patties but, due to his marketing job, he needs to get acquainted with people, 
and so on. Then is his job the ultimate end. Oh, no, his job is just to make a living, 
and then one is tempted to ask: but when does he live? All his efforts appear, in 
this light, as a precise preparation for a time of happiness and joy, but when will 
this time come, what will it consist of? "An experience of pleasure" one might 
say, or "having a great time", to use a more common expression. Be it as it may, 
let us now turn to Carmen's experience and try to work out why we do not see 
her walk to the news-stand as merely instrumental. 
It is clear that Can11en likes walking in the morning, but it seems that she is 
more motivated if her walk has some particular purpose, say, buying the paper. 
Of course, this might be so because to the pleasure of walking Carmen adds its 
instrumental value. However, this description keeps both elements apart and 
this may not be correct. It may also happen that the very experience of walking 
is different because it has a certain sort of purpose; after all, we can understand 
that Can11en is more fond of a walk with that kind of purpose than just walking 
aimlessly. However, in that case, the end will not be external to the experience of 
walking, but give rise to a new kind of experience. Thereby, the connection 
between getting the paper and walúáng=is not just that the latter is an instrument 
of the former, but also that the former transforms and enriches the latter. For 
Carmen, walking-to-buy-the-newspaper is a more interesting experience than 
just walking, and this additional value is not independent of the fact that walk-
ing is a means to a certain kind of purpose, like getting the paper. We may then 
say that in Carmen's case, as opposed to Michael's, the pursuit of a certain end 
(i.e., buying the paper) is a constitutive part of her walking experience.40 
,. Cf. Korsgaard [ 1983), I 85 for a related remark on the value of a mink coat . 
.., The notion of constitutive link is not more problematic than a constitutive part of a 
whole. One might reasonably claim that it is constitutive of this table to be made out of 
wood. For a table-shaped object that were made of a different stuff could not be this table. 
Rclatedly, one might urge that it is const itutive of this object being of a certain kind (namely, 
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In general, we could say that an acúáváíó=or engagement may bear constitu-
tive links with several other activities and engagements, and that the array of 
constitutive links of a given activity A is deftned by all those activities and 
circumstances of a subject's life which contribute to fix the experience of engag-
ing in that activity A. The existence of a constitutive link between two activities 
does not preclude the presence of an insttumental connection at all. On the 
contrary, what Michael's example suggests is that an instrumental connection 
may be both a requisite for the emergence and preservation of a constitutive 
link, and also a factor that alters the very experience of walking. In fact, it is 
patily because of the latter phenomenon that we may claim that buying the 
paper is constitutively linked to the walking experience. 
We may learn from this that the glue which unites the different activities and 
projects that compose the life of a subject need not be merely instrumental, such 
that there are other kinds of glue like the one that constitutive links provide. 
However, the fact that a life may not only be instrumentally but constitutively 
atiiculated is of some effect to the notion of sense. 
According to the intrinsic vs. extrinsic approach, there are some ends which 
a subject may envisage as intrinsically valuable, while the rest of activities and 
concerns appear as mere means (or hurdles) for the attainment of such ends. 
Carmen's example suggests, however, some articulations of value that are ne-
glected by that approach. Thus, we have seen that some activities may have a 
noninstrumental value pattly because they are proper means to cettain ends and 
that, conversely, the value of the ends is not independent of their capacity to 
affect those activities that lead to them, so that the latter may become noninsttu-
mentally valuable too. Hence, if we take Carmen's case as an illustration of a 
more general h·end, we could say that the noninstrumental sense of an activity 
depends on its location in a network of constitutive links, and the value of an 
a table) that it has, for instance, a wooden board. For if an object did not have a board, it 
would not be a table, and if it were not wooden, it would not be this object. If we should agree 
on this, I could assert that, in general, P is a constitutive part of a particular entity E if and 
only if E were deprived of P, E would cease to exist; and, on the other hand, P is a 
constitutive part of E being of class K if and only if E were deprived of P, E would no longer 
belong to class K. 
How does this notion of constitutive parts apply to experiences? If one grants that the 
numerical identity of experiences is fixed relative to the numerical identity of the subjects 
(and activities) that bear them, we can legitimately say that the activity of buying a newspa-
per is constitutively linked to Carmen's walking experience because, hadn't her walk been 
oriented toward that buying activity, it would have been an experience of a different kind. 
This is the point that I wanted to stress. However, some elements may not only be consti-
tutive parts of an experience R being of a certain kind K, but of the existence of that 
particular experience and, more interestingly, of a subject having experiences of a certain 
kind. For it may be a metaphysical fact about Carmen, about her being the particular subject 
she is, that she cannot have a certain class of experience but only can engage in certain 
activities or be in relation with certain people. Such experiences should certainly be more 
nuclear to her character than the experience of walking to buy the newspaper: they might 
include, for instance, the sort of attachments that Michael established in his childhood. Cf 
Maclntyre (1981), eh. 15, Winch [1987b), and Wiggins (1975-6), [1987) for some related 
notions of constitutive link. 
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end will, in turn, be pa1tly relative to its capacity to affect the experience of 
engaging in certain activities. Let us reserve the word "significance" to name 
this aspect of an activity or end.41 
The network of constitutive links that belongs to a given activity is not, 
however, something given, but something in need of constant re-creation. The 
significance that an engagement has for a subject is not gained once and for-
ever, but an aspect of the experience that requires constant care and concern. In 
this respect, we may assert that Carmen's walk was exciting and appealing to her 
because she had managed to create and cultivate the adequate constitutive 
links between her daily walk and other activities; while Michael's walk was 
dispirited and merely instrumental because it lacked the required constitutive 
links. 
The notion of significance may certainly help to apprehend and a1ticulate 
the value that certain events, locations, objects, persons, rituals, and gestw-es 
may have in the life of a subject (or a community). One can thus make sense, for 
instance, of the idea that ce1tain experiences or situations may permeate the 
entire life of a subject and, accordingly, recognize the crucial contribution of 
childhood to one's identity. Similarly, one can see how the present life of a 
community is partly constituted by the perception of its history and its relation 
to other communities. Thus, the significance of architecture in our lives cannot 
be alien to its special role in the awareness that a community may have of its own 
history. For the different patterns in the articulation of public and private space 
are, among other things, like sensible hallmarks of the constitution of a certain 
way of leading our lives. 
The identity of a subject is then partly fixed by her location in a social (and, 
therefore, historical) space, that is, by the significance that a certain social and 
historical web may have in her life. Undoubtedly, a subject's attachments are an 
impmtant ingredient in the articulation of such a location. So, we may go back to 
Charles's case, and explore the complex ways in which the notion of significance 
is connected to that of attachment. 
To begin, we can say that, as Charles's case brings to light, a subject's 
integrity is constitutively linked to her attendance-and the actual fate-of the 
people to whom she is attached; or, to put it another way, that the cultivation of 
one's attachment has a deep significance in one's life, since it affects one's 
sense of integrity or degradation. It follows that, in the case of attachments, 
significance is conditioned by certain normative elements that are rather absent 
in other experiences of significance. The significance that for a subject's integ-
rity may have a certain response crucially depends on the question of the latter's 
appropriateness or legitimacy. An illegitimate response would deteriorate the 
subject's integrity, while, on the contrary, a proper response would enhance it. 
The role of this noêmúíávÉ=issue is virtually inexistent, though, in quite trivial 
41 We might also say that a significant engagement is intrinsically valuable. However, I 
am quite reluctant to employ the word " intrinsic" because this may easily encourage the 
thought that an activity may have value independently of its connections with other activi· 
ties. This is precisely what the notion of significance is born to deny. 
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experiences like walking to buy the. newspaper. One could hardly dismiss 
Michael's slmmk way of buying the paper as illegitimate, even if a rather remote 
sense of illegitimacy may be present here, insofar as one could feel entitled to 
object to ce1tain ways of wasting a life. rt seems, then, that even if the notion of 
significance requires the presence of a non instrumental connection, the latter 
need not encompass the normative constraint that is present insofar as attach-
ments are concerned . 
The experience of significance is involved in attachments in a second, re-
lated, but different way. rt is specific to attachments to impose cettain demands 
upon us; that they require from us a certain kind of response. Moreover, it may 
form a part of that demand, as in Charles's case: that the appropriate response 
should be one that, for instance, the victim (or her relatives) would recognize as 
an expression of genuine concern. But, of course, a response of this nature is 
one which has a certain significance for the subject in question; one that cannot 
be performed in a merely instrumental way. It seems then that our attaclunents 
may impose upon us cettain demands of significance with respect to our re-
sponse, and this is a further respect in which the social world does not have a 
mere insh·umental value for us. In fact, someone who never feels the need for 
that kind of expressive response would appear inhuman to us. 
We are now in a position to appraise the argument for the absurd that was 
mentioned in section 3. This argument assumes that we may consider the value 
of our lives from two in·econcilable perspectives. There is an inner perspective 
from which one's engagements may appear as meaningful. However, we can 
also access an external, naturalist stance wherein all activities and concerns are 
ultimately vain and valueless. It is hard then to figure out how the subject can 
integrate these two perspectives into a single, unified experience. This upshot 
may also be reinforced by some other considerations about the nature of the 
divide between the objective and the subjective.42 This problem cannot be ad-
dressed here in full. However, in the following paragraphs I will point out how, in 
my view, the notion of significance may help to create some space where the 
idea of a unified experience becomes intelligible, where the internal and external 
perspectives might merge into a single perception. 
The argument for the absurd assumes that the unimpmtance of our ends to 
the universe is the criterion of their ultimate futility. This may sound like a 
reasonable position insofar as, according to the intrinsic vs. extrinsic approach 
to value, the sense of an activity is derivative upon the imp01tance or intrinsic 
value of certain ends. In our approach, however, the notion of significance 
challenges this narrow treatment of sense. In the light of this notion, the percep-
tion of the unimportance of our activities to the universe does not necessarily 
lead to the absurd that might affect the sense of our lives differently. To assess 
the impact that this perception might have on the significance of our concerns, 
let us ask how this perception may alter the experience of engaging in certain 
activities, and check whether it would necessarily deteriorate their significance. 
42 Cf., for instance, Nagel [1979a], (1986). 
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The perception of the unimportance to the universe may surely affect the 
significance of our lives in various ways. One of them is associated with the 
dismissal of any transcendent legend, which would speci:fY the means by which 
one could reach a plentiful culminating stage, a paradise. We have already indi-
cated how this dismissal may shake the robustness of our experience of sense, 
since it deprives us of some resources that are quite useful to reinforce that 
experience. The idea of a plentiful culmination has played, and keeps playing, 
that role in the lives of many people. That idea helps them to swallow the hard-
ships of life, their own suffering and that of their beloved persons, the distress 
that massacres cause, and so on. On some occasions, that belief may really alter 
their experience, actually transforming their suffering into a significant experi-
ence; a capacity that they would lose if they did not have that convictionY On 
other occasions, that belief will act as a promise of redemption, as guaranteeing 
a future compensation of present efforts. Thereby, the current suffering will be 
conceived as a mere instrument to reach that state. This dual strategy provides 
a powerful safety net against the absurd: it helps to increase the significance of 
any distressing experience, but, even if this fails, at least one retains the promise 
of a future, generous compensation. Our naturalist outlook forces us to live 
without this promise, and the recognition of this fact restricts the materials upon 
which to build a meaningful life. This is an important respect in which our expe-
rience is affected by our naturalism. 
However, the argument for the absurd that we are discussing presses in a 
different direction. Its point is that, once we perceive the aimlessness of the 
universe, our experience is necessarily split into two colliding perspectives: one 
in tenns of which a human life may be meaningful and another in which it is 
ultimately empty. But why should it be so? Nagel seeks to motivate the inevita-
bility of that division by means of an example. He claims that, once we become 
aware of the outside perspective, one is like the husband who welcomes his 
spouse back home after her elopement: our experience, like their relationship, is 
no longer the same.44 I do not see, however, how this analogy serves Nagel's 
purposes. The fact that 1he relationship will no longer be the same does not 
entail that the experience of their relationship will now constantly shift between 
two perceptions: (a) the perception of their faithful relationship before the elope-
ment, and (b) the perception of the adultery. On the contrary, it sounds perfectly 
possible that a new, perhaps more profound relationship will gradually emerge 
out of this conflict. The experience of this new relation will surely be condi-
tioned by the elopement and, therefore, the significance in their lives will cer-
tainly differ from their initial experience, but it would not necessarily consist of 
a constant alternation between two conflicting experiences. 
But why shouldn't something like tllis happen with the initial collision be-
tween the internal and external perspective? One might reply, as Nagel seems to 
" This is partly the experience of the Saint in "Life on a string" (cf. sec. 1). 
44 Cf. Nagel [l 979b), 20. 
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suggest, that the perception of the unimpo11ance of our lives for the universe 
breeds the experience of irony: " If'sub specie aeternitatis' there is no reason to 
believe that anything matters, then that doesn't matter either, and we can ap-
proach our absurd lives with irony instead of despair."45 One might insist that 
irony is the kind of attitude of someone who lives divided, who feels both 
engaged and distant with regard to their goals and activities. Yet I do not see 
why irony is the only available response. In fact, there are many activities where 
the perception of their external unimportance does not favor the adoption of a 
split, ironical attitude. Games and sports seem to constitute an obvious case: 
one may enthusiastically engage in playing (or watching) a soccer match de-
spite its unimpmtance from a larger perspective, but rather because of that 
unimportance. It would sound weird to claim that those who perceive the trivial-
ity of soccer can only practice it with a divided attitude. This is not to deny, of 
course, that the perception of its h·iviality contributes to fix the significance of 
engaging in that activity. After all, soccer may be taken too seriously and, for 
those who do adopt such an attitude, soccer would have a significance quite 
different from the one it has for those of us who take this activity less dramati-
cally. Sti 11, this reduction in dramatism does not lead to an ironical duality, but to 
a sort of joyfullightness.46 
Sexual games may constitute a particularly clear counterexample to Nagel's 
conclusion that, given that our ends are i.tTclevant from an external perspective, 
we are bound to color our activities with irony. The interest that a subject may 
take in certain sexual games is manifestly relative to her sexual desire: if the 
subject were deprived of that desire, she would find those games ridiculous and 
boring. Yet, the knowledge of this fact does not allow the subject to adopt an 
ironical attitude toward the sexual game when she engages in them as a result of 
her desire. For as soon as a distant, ironical attitude emerges, the enchantment 
dispels and the game is over. It seems then that sexual games are constitutively 
serious, even if it would fonn a part of certain ways of playing it that one should 
pretend that they are not, since the mere presence of irony inevitably abolishes 
the game. So, we get an activity, which is not at all peripheral in human life, where 
the fact that its value is recognized as relative to the subject's desire cannot lead 
to the adoption of a distant attitude. 
We may then conclude that the perception of the unimportance of an activ-
ity, even if it may alter the significance ofthe latter, does not necessarily lead to 
the emergence of a split, ironical experience. For there are resources in our 
practices on the basis of which a different response may be articulated. 1 have 
suggested sports and sexual games as patt of the materials that one may gather 
for this purpose, but some of our experiences before science may help too. 
Consider, for instance, the sense of awe that may accompany the study of 
astronomy, physics, evolution, and biology. From this perspective, beings and 
'
5 Nagcl [1979b], 23. 
'
6 Cf. Marrades [1997] for an exploration of a closely related idea in the writings of 
Schiller. 
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materials in the universe are not apprehended as putative instruments for our 
satisfaction. Rather, they fonu with us a web and share with us their smallness 
and irrelevance. This is hardly the experience of distance and irony. 
5. To Close 
Several elements that may affect the value of our lives have been singled out 
throughout this paper. The composite thesis mentioned experiences such as 
desire-satisfaction, pleasure, and choice. The experience of integrity (or degra-
dation), as well as that of significance was then added. All these elements may 
consequently appear as different goods in terms of which the life of a subject is 
supposed to be shaped and assessed. These goods are not free from conflict 
and tension, since they actually may be incompatible under some circumstan-
ces.47 A subject, for instance, may have to renounce the satisfaction of certain 
desires for the sake of her integrity and, in the end, this frustration may leave 
some sequels in the significance of her life. It may sound then as if the most that 
one could do is to search for a certain kind of balance, and it may be true that, 
under certain conditions, the experience of significance is the ultimate criterion 
that this balance has been achieved. Although, the pmticular circumstances 
that a subject may encounter, the object and strength of her desires, as well as 
the specific way in which she may envisage her integrity, will defmitely condi-
tion how difficult it is for that subject to attain her balance. 
We are not bound, however, to concede any privileged position to a bal-
anced existence and, therefore, to the experience of significance. One may de-
cide to sacrifice balance for the sake of integrity: even when there is no hope 
that one finally would be rewarded with a deeper, more robust kind of balance. 
Similarly, the satisfaction of our strongest desires, or the pursuit of pleasure, 
may override other goods, including the benefits of equilibrium.48 So, we may 
say that the fundamental dimension in terms of which we are bound to orient 
and assess our lives consists of a certain atticulation of elements such as choice, 
desire-satisfaction, pleasure, integrity, and significance. It is an essential feature 
of this fundamental dimension that such goods may conflict and, therefore, 
there is nothing like an ideal articulation, that each subject is bound to quest for 
her own fonn. Such is, we may say, our conception of the self. The sense in 
which there may be such a quest, as well as the principles that may guide it, is 
something that we must leave for another occasion. Although, as we have seen, 
our conception of the self defines the resources that are available to us in such 
a quest and, therefore, the boundaries within which it must be perfonned. 
47 Cf Berlin (1980], Witliams [l98 la). 
'
8 A subject might seek balance or harmony within an aspect of her life even at the price 
of leading an overall unbalanced life. A painter, for instance, may be devoted to create 
sophisticated, harmonious works and, as a result, neglect other important aspects of her life. 
J.E. Corbi, Self and Sense in a Natural World liS 
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